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ABSTRACT
Introduction: Established in 1994, Pakistan’s polio program demonstrated early success. However, 
despite over 120 supplementary immunization activities in the last decade, polio eradication efforts 
in Pakistan have been unable to achieve their objective of halting polio transmission. Variable govern-
ance, and inconsistent leadership and accountability have hindered the success of the polio program 
and the quality of the campaigns. Insecurity and terrorism has interrupted polio activities, and com-
munity fears and misbeliefs about polio vaccinations continue to persist.
Areas covered: The article consists of a systematic review of the barriers and facilitators associated with 
the delivery of polio eradication activities in Pakistan. We also provide a comprehensive review of the 
policy and programmatic decisions made by the Pakistan Polio Programme since 1994. Searches were 
conducted on Embase and Medline databases and 25 gray literature sources.
Expert opinion: Polio eradication efforts must be integrated with other preventive health services, 
particularly immunization services. Addressing the underlying causes of polio refusals including under-
development and social exclusion will help counteract resistance to polio vaccination. Achieving polio 
eradication will require building health systems that provide comprehensive community-centered care, 
and improving governance and systems of accountability.
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1. Introduction
The Global Polio Eradication Initiative (GPEI) was launched in 
1988, with the goal of eradication and containment of all wild, 
vaccine-related and Sabin polioviruses worldwide [1]. Polio 
eradication efforts began in Pakistan in 1994, through the 
launch of the Pakistan Polio Eradication Programme [2]. The 
Pakistan Polio Eradication Programme is a public–private part-
nership led by the federal government, and supported by GPEI 
partners including WHO, UNICEF, BMFG, and CDC [3]. Despite 
national efforts to eradicate polio, the transmission of wild 
poliovirus is ongoing in Pakistan [4].
Presently, Pakistan and Afghanistan are the only coun-
tries where the transmission of endemic wild poliovirus has 
never stopped [5]. Given global interest in eradicating 
polio, polio eradication initiatives have been funded 
through a diverse range of donors made up of national 
governments, private organizations/non-governmental 
donors, and multisectoral partnerships. Since 1985, more 
than US$ 17 billion has been donated to support the GPEI. 
Between 1985 and 2019, the Government of Pakistan con-
tributed roughly US$387 million and US$121 million to the 
GPEI through loans provided by the Islamic Development 
Bank and Japan International Cooperation Agency, respec-
tively, and roughly US$ 58 million through assistance from 
other national governments [6].
Roughly 20,000 wild poliovirus cases were reported in 
Pakistan in the early 1990s, however the polio program has 
reduced this by up to 99% [2]. Today, Pakistan continues 
to be affected by wild poliovirus type 1 (WPV1) and circu-
lating vaccine-derived poliovirus type 2 (cVDPV2) [7]. 
A record low of eight cases was reported in 2017; however, 
this was followed by an increase in subsequent years, with 
12 cases in 2018, 147 cases in 2019, and 84 cases in 2020 
(Figure 1). Polio transmission is highly active in certain core 
reservoir districts, including Karachi, Peshawar, and the 
Quetta block. Polio cases have also been identified in 
northern Sindh and Southern Punjab [4,8]. A large propor-
tion of cases are among Pashto-speaking populations [9]. 
The polio program’s success is highly dependent on vacci-
nating high-risk mobile populations (HRMP) and internally 
displaced persons (IDP), who often have inconsistent 
access to the health system [10]. The polio program imple-
ments numerous vaccination campaigns every year 
wherein roughly 260,000 health workers go door-to–door 
to ensure every child under five years of age is vaccinated 
against polio [2]. During vaccination campaigns, special 
attention is given to the core reservoir districts [4].
Despite efforts by the Pakistani polio program, vaccina-
tion bans, rumors, and conspiracy theories that polio eradi-
cation is enabling foreign bodies to destabilize the country  
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continue to be a barrier to polio eradication [11–13]. Access 
to children in security-compromised areas, and attacks on 
healthcare workers have created an insecure environment 
where the safety of both the providers and recipients has 
been jeopardized [14]. In addition to these demand-related 
issues, governance and operational failures continue to per-
sist as a barrier to polio vaccination [15,16].
The emergence of the coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID- 
19) has posed a new threat to polio eradication efforts [17]. 
In April 2020, polio vaccination campaigns and routine 
immunization programs across Pakistan were halted to miti-
gate the spread of COVID-19. Staff and resources from the 
polio program were redirected in the fight against COVID-19, 
highlighting the strength of the program’s infrastructure 
[18,19]. This strategy has unintentionally increased the sus-
ceptibility of already vulnerable children to vaccine- 
preventable diseases (VPD) such as polio [18]. Although the 
government’s response to COVID-19 has been lauded, it begs 
the question why has polio not had received the same 
political commitment [19].
Understanding the barriers and facilitators to service delivery, 
and the operational factors that influence functioning of the 
polio program is essential to its success. This systematic review 
will present the following: i) a timeline highlighting distinct 
polio–related policies, programs, and activities implemented in 
Pakistan since 1994, and ii) barriers and facilitators associated 
with the delivery of polio eradication activities in Pakistan.
2. Methods
2.1. Search strategy
A systematic search of indexed peer-reviewed literature pub-
lished between 1 January 2000 to 30 July 2020 was conducted 
in Embase and Medline databases using the OVID platform. 
We used the PICO methodology to develop a search strategy 
containing relevant key words and medical subject headings 
MeSH. Where possible, our search strategy utilized the 
‘explode’ function for MeSH terms. We also hand-searched 
reference lists of studies included in full-text screening for 
any additional studies. The complete search strategy is pre-
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Figure 1. Poliovirus case count in Pakistan: 1994 – 2020 [20–24,118].
Article highlights
● Polio eradication requires the intervention of multiple stakeholders at 
different levels of the health system
● Variable governance and inconsistent leadership have compromised 
the functioning of polio eradication activities
● The morale of polio workers is low due to inconsistent pay, limited 
opportunities for promotion, and consistent threats of insecurity
● Improved field monitoring during polio campaigns and through polio 
surveillance systems are needed
● Misbeliefs and misperceptions about polio vaccination among com-
munity members continue to persist
● Integration of polio activities with other preventive health services 
especially child health, nutrition and routine immunizations may 
address community resistance and increase program reach
● Terrorism and insecurity are still a consistent concern for the polio 
program through blocking access to certain geographies and result-
ing in attacks on polio workers
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For the gray literature search, we searched the websites of 
25 stakeholders which are involved in delivering polio eradica-
tion or public health activities across Pakistan, including gov-
ernmental agencies, national organizations, and international 
organizations. These websites included the Ministry of 
National Health Services, Regulations, and Coordination, the 
health departments of each province and territory, Asian 
Development Bank, Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation, Centers 
for Disease Control, GAVI, Global Polio Eradication Initiative, 
Japan International Cooperation Agency, Pakistan Health 
Knowledge Hub, Pakistan Polio Eradication Programme, 
Relief Web, United Nations UNDP, UNFPA, UNICEF, UNICEF 
Innocenti, World Health Organization (WHO EMRO, WHO Iris, 
WHO Pakistan), and World Bank (Open Knowledge Repository, 
Projects Database). When searching each website, we used 
search terms which captured polio, immunization, and general 
health programs and policies in Pakistan. Grey literature docu-
ments published from 2000 onwards were reviewed.
2.2. Eligibility criteria
Eligible peer-reviewed studies included those reporting pri-
mary data on polio eradication activities in Pakistan. The pub-
lication must have been available in English, and must have 
described barriers and facilitators related to polio eradication. 
Exclusion criteria included editorials, commentary pieces, opi-
nion pieces, serological studies, systematic reviews, guidelines, 
and non-English publications.
Eligible gray literature documents included any policy or 
program-related proposal, evaluation, or report, which 
reported on polio eradication activities in Pakistan. Grey litera-
ture documents were included if they reported on: i) barriers 
or facilitators related to polio eradication activities, or ii) any 
polio-related policies, programs, political events, partnerships, 
religious advocacy events, milestones, or external events 
which impacted polio eradication efforts.
2.3. Data extraction and analysis
Peer-reviewed studies were managed on Covidence, an online 
software used to streamline the systematic review process. 
Records identified from both databases were imported into 
Covidence for screening, and duplicates were removed. Titles 
and abstracts were screened in duplicate, full–text screening 
was done by a single reviewer, and data extraction was done 
in duplicate, followed by data matching. A single reviewer 
downloaded, screened and extracted every gray literature 
document (see Figure 2). A total of 32 articles from the peer 
reviewed literature [25–56] and 13 from the gray literature 
[57–69] were included.
Figure 2. Prisma.
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Barriers and facilitators were extracted from the peer- 
reviewed and gray literature in Microsoft Excel. Key data 
extracted included study design, study characteristics, type 
of data, and barriers and facilitators which had an impact on 
polio eradication activities. The data were then imported in to 
NVivo 12, a qualitative data analysis software, and a thematic 
analysis of the barriers and facilitators was conducted through 
an inductive process. Barriers and facilitators were categorized 
in to reviewer-generated codes, followed by broader cate-
gories, and ultimately broad themes.
Polio-related policies, programs, and activities were 
extracted from the gray literature using a separate extraction 
form in Microsoft Excel. Key data extracted included activity 
name and description, impact, implementation level, and sta-
keholders involved. The extracted data was used to form 
a timeline of events, as depicted in Figure 3.
3. Results
3.1. Policy & program overview
Since 1994, a variety of programs and policies have been 
implemented as part of polio eradication efforts (Figure 3). In 
this section, we will provide an overview of the polio–related 
policy and programmatic decisions organized by major polio 
project timelines (Table 1).
Figure 3. Overview of polio policies and programs in Pakistan.
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Description The GPEI developed the GPEI Emergency Action Plan 2012–2013 for Nigeria, Pakistan, and Afghanistan. The goal of this 
plan was to help get the GPEI back on track in the endemic regions through an emergency approach. The plan builds 
upon the strategies highlighted in the GPEI Strategic Plan 2012-2012, and was focused on developing appropriate 








Description Piloted in Nigeria, N-STOP is a CDC-WHO collaborative program which supports eradication efforts in polio priority 
countries, by strengthening local surveillance, training local health professionals, and deploying public health 
professionals accordingly. The National Stop Transmission of Polio (N-STOP) program was established in Pakistan in 2012; 






Description The Islamic Advisory Group for Polio Eradication (IAG) adopted a new action plan that sought to help eradicate polio in the 
remaining Muslim nations. The meeting was hosted by Al Azhar in Cairo and was attended by Islamic scholars and 
experts of the IAG. Specific to Pakistan, the IAG aimed to enhance the work of the National Islamic Advisory Group for 
Polio Eradication in Pakistan, through increased advocacy and communication activities, and also planned to organize for 







Description The Pakistan Polio Eradication Program, a public–private partnership between the Government of Pakistan and partners 
from the GPEI (WHO, UNICEF, BMGF, Rotary International, and CDC), was launched in 1994. The initiation of polio 
eradication efforts was signified by the first set of supplementary immunization activities (SIAs) through National 
Immunization Days (NIDs).
Classification National programmatic action
Trivalent OPV 
(1994–2016)
Description Trivalent OPV (tOPV) was the only vaccine used in SIAs between 1994-2004, after which a combination of monovalent and 
bivalent vaccines were used. 
The trivalent vaccine was withdrawn globally in 2016.





Description The program began conducting acute flaccid paralysis (AFP) surveillance in 1995. As part of the AFP surveillance, AFP cases 
in children aged less than 15 years were reported to surveillance bodies and further investigated as possible polio cases




Description AFP surveillance was fully functional by 1998, after provincial staff were provided training and computerized case listings 
were introduced.





Description To ensure comprehensive coverage of border regions and children in transit, immunization activities in Pakistan and 
Afghanistan were synchronized.
Classification National programmatic action
Stop Transmission 
of Polio (STOP) 
program (1999)
Description The STOP program is a collaborative program run by the CDC, WHO, and UNICEF. In 1999, the Stop Transmission of Polio 
(STOP) program was launched; international health professionals were sent to Pakistan on 3 to 5 months assignments to 
assist with polio eradication activities and improve the quality of surveillance activities.






Description During the implementation of the 1998-1999 subnational immunization days (SNIDs) in Pakistan, a house-to-house 
vaccination approach was introduced. The house-to–house vaccination approach was expanded further in 2000, and 
became a core aspect of Pakistan’s polio eradication strategy.






Description In 2003, the First Partnership for Polio Eradication project was implemented by the Government of Pakistan. [24] This 
project was funded by the World Bank, and the objective of this project was to support the supply to the Government of 
Pakistan (GoP) of 50% of the Oral Polio Vaccine (OPV) needed for Supplemental Immunization Activities during 
2003–2005. Project funds were transferred to UNICEF, who was responsible for vaccine procurement and delivery, as per 
an agreement between the Government of Pakistan and UNICEF. The project financed the procurement of 371 million 
oral polio vaccines (OPV) for SIAs held between 2003 to 2006, and roughly 30 million children were immunized in each 
round.
Classification National programmatic action
First National EPI 
policy (2005)
Description In 2004, the National EPI Advisory Group (NEAG) developed the first National EPI policy, which was adopted by the former 
Ministry of Health in 2005. The new EPI policy introduced new vaccines and technologies, and aligned its goals with 
priorities set at the global and regional level. Specific to vaccinations, the policy introduced new strategies for 
immunizations and vaccine preventable disease (VPD) surveillance.
Classification National policy formation and modifications
Monovalent OPV 
(2005–2010)
Description Monovalent OPV (mOPV) was introduced in Pakistan in 2005 (mOPV1) and 2007 (mOPV3), and were used until the 
introduction of bivalent OPV in 2010.






Description In 2006, the Second Partnership for Polio Eradication project was implemented by the Government of Pakistan, an 
extension of the initial project implemented in 2003. The second project was also financed by the World Bank, and 
vaccine procurement and delivery was also handled by UNICEF. The second project financed the procurement of 
approximately 590 million doses of OPV to children between 2006 to 2008. Approximately 30 million children were 
immunized in each round of SIAs.




Description Finger-marking was introduced into polio campaigns in 2008 to objectively measure polio quality. This measure was 
intended to complement parental recall and other methods used to identify previously vaccinated children.
Classification National programmatic action
(Continued )
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Description In 2009, the Federal Ministry of Health established the Inter-Provincial Committee for Polio (IPCP), which was chaired by the 
Federal Minister of Health. The ICPC was responsible for managing inter–sectoral coordination, monitoring the 
engagement of officials working at district and union council levels, and bringing together all provincial health ministers 
in order to collectively address challenges experienced when implementing polio eradication strategies.
Classification Federal alliance
EPI Policy revised to 
involve LHWs 
(2009)
Description In 2009, the EPI policy was revised and provided guidelines highlighting greater involvement of lady health workers (LHWs) 
in immunization programs. The revised EPI policy specified that LHWs who are trained in EPI will deliver vaccination 
services, and LHWs who are not trained in EPI will assist the vaccinator by organizing vaccination services and mobilizing 
community members.






Description In 2009, the third ‘Partnership for Polio Eradication’ project was implemented by the Government of Pakistan, the final 
extension of the initial project implemented in 2003. The third project was also financed by the World Bank, and UNICEF 
continued to be responsible for vaccine procurement and delivery. The third project ensured timely supply and 
procurement of OPV for polio campaigns conducted between 2009-2014, and approximately 32 million children were 
immunized in each round of SIAs.




Description Surveillance activities were expanded in 2009, when environmental surveillance was implemented. Sewage testing began 
in Lahore and Karachi, and enabled virus transmission to be monitored so that poliovirus reservoirs could be identified.
Classification National programmatic action
Bivalent OPV 
(2010–present)
Description Bivalent OPV (bOPV) containing wild polioviruses 1 and 3 was introduced in 2010. bOPV replaced tOPV in 2016, and 
continues to be used today,





Description The passing of the 18th Amendment to the Constitution by the National Assembly of Pakistan in 2010 resulted in the 
decentralization of Pakistan’s federal health care system. As a consequence, the Federal Ministry of Health was devolved, 
and health care responsibilities were transferred from federal to provincial authorities.





Description The National Emergency Action Plan (NEAP) was developed and launched in 2011. After limited success of the NEAP 2011, 
and Augmented NEAP was launched in 2012, with the goal of stopping poliovirus transmission by the end of 2012. The 
goal of ending transmission was not achieved, thus followed the implementation of a yearly NEAP in 2013. This is an 
annual strategic plan which has been released every year to date, and outlines the program’s eradication strategy, 
priorities, and innovations. The NEAP includes coordination with and support from GPEI partners.





Description The Prime Minister’s Polio Monitoring & Coordination Cell was established in 2011. The purpose of this new Cell was to 
monitor and coordinate polio-eradication activities nationwide. The specific duties of the Cell included the following: 1) 
To liaise on a regular basis with the Provincial Monitoring Cells, Provincial health departments, National and Provincial 
EPI teams, Chief Secretaries office, DCOs, EDOs Health and other relevant departments and organizations to regularly 
monitor the progress of the Polio Eradication Initiative and provide feedback to the Prime Minister. 2) To facilitate and 
ensure the establishing of Polio Monitoring Cells at the Provincial level in line with announcement made by the Prime 
Minister on 14 January 2011. 3) To provide guidance, technical input and situation analysis to the National Task Force on 
Polio Eradication led by the Prime Minister.
Classification Federal alliance




Description The President of Pakistan declared polio eradication a national emergency, and established the National Task Force on 
Polio Eradication in 2012. The Task Force was to be chaired by the Prime Minister, and constituted of provincial chief 






Description In 2012, a National Vaccine Management Committee (NVMC) was established at the federal level, with representation from 
EPI, WHO, and UNICEF. The Committee was responsible for supporting vaccine management and reporting, including 
vaccine storage, transport, and utilization. The Committee was developed in response to the recommendations made by 
UNICEF, after they conducted a vaccine management review which highlighted issues with vaccine storage and wastage, 
and cold chain maintenance.
Classification Federal alliance
Revision of security 
operations (2012)
Description After a series of attacks on polio workers and vaccination campaigns in 2012, the program adapted and began to operate 
under a new security framework, with intensified security operations in place for frontline health workers.
Classification National programmatic action




Description Section 144 of the Criminal Procedure Code was invoked for the first time during a polio campaign in Pakistan in 2012, by 
the District Coordination Officer (DCO) of Faisalabad. Section 144 was implemented to counteract vaccine refusals, and 
made it a criminal offense for parents to refuse vaccinating their children during polio campaigns. Furthermore, under 
Section 188 of the Pakistan Penal Code, action could be taken against parents who refused to let health teams vaccinate 
their children against polio during the anti-polio campaigns. According to press releases, this seems to be the first time 
that the law held non-compliant caregivers accountable, however Section 144 was also implemented in other cities such 
as Peshawar (2014), Charsadda (2015), and Mardan (2020).




as an Islamic 
responsibility 
(2013)
Description The polio communication approach saw a shift in 2013; with support from UNICEF, the Government of Pakistan began to 
emphasize polio vaccination as an Islamic responsibility.
Classification National programmatic action




Description A prominent Pakistani religious scholar, Maulana Sami Ul Haq, issued a Fatwa (Islamic ruling) urging parents to immunize 
their children against poliovirus.
Classification National programmatic action
(Continued )
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3.1.1. 1994 – 2001: Early days of polio eradication
The Expanded Program on Immunization (EPI) was launched in 
Pakistan in 1978 and included immunization against several 
diseases including polio. However, through support from the 
GPEI, the Pakistan Polio Eradication Programme was launched as 
an independent program in 1994 [2,3,70]. The initiation of polio 
eradication efforts was signified by the first set of supplementary 
immunization activities (SIAs) through National Immunization 
Days (NIDs) [71]. In 1995, the program began conducting 
acute flaccid paralysis (AFP) surveillance, and AFP surveillance 
was fully functional by 1998 [14,72,73]. The last case of wild 
poliovirus type 2 (WPV2) in Pakistan was reported in 1997 [74]. 
This positive milestone so early in the program supported the 
belief that polio eradication in Pakistan was possible.
Starting in 1998, immunization activities in Pakistan and 
Afghanistan were planned in synchronization to ensure border 
regions and children in transit were covered comprehensively 
[14]. In 1999, the Stop Transmission of Polio (STOP) program 
was launched, which deployed international health profes-
sionals to Pakistan to assist with polio eradication and 






Description The Government of Pakistan launched the Emergency Operations Centers (EOC), at both the federal and provincial levels. 
These centers were to be supported by Polio Eradication Committees at the district and union-council levels, and were 







Description The International Ulama Conference on Polio Eradication was held in 2014, and had representation from Pakistan, Saudi 
Arabia, Egypt, and other Islamic nations. At this conference, the Ulama of Pakistan issued a Fatwa declaring the use of 
polio vaccine completely permissible under Islamic Sharia, and they also reassured the community that the polio vaccine 
does not contain any harmful ingredients, further endorsing its use.
Classification National programmatic action
Revision of National 
EPI Policy (2015)
Description The revised EPI policy was released in 2015, and outlined the following objectives: 1) To affirm the commitment of the 
Government of Pakistan (GOP) to provide safe, effective and cost-effective vaccination against Vaccine Preventable 
Diseases (VPDs). 2) To set national standards and guidelines for immunization aligned with the global goals and 
evidence base, and encourage the program for generation of local evidence for vaccination against VPDs.
Classification National policy formation and modifications
IPV introduced into 
the national EPI 
(2015)
Description According to the revised national EPI policy, one dose of IPV was introduced into the routine immunization schedule.
Classification National policy formation and modifications
Revision of security 
plans to include 
armed forces 
(2015)
Description Ongoing attacks against polio workers led to the revision of the program’s security plan in 2015. Minister for National 
Health Services Saira Afzal Tarar chaired an emergency high level polio security meeting, which was attended by 
representative of Armed Forces, Ministry of Interior. Secretary, and Ministry of National Health Services. The outcomes of 
this meeting were as following: 1) A post incident inquiry be conducted in the event of any polio–related attack. These 
inquires will be conducted by a team consisting of a Ministry of Interior representative, an official from the intelligence 
agencies, a District Police Officer representative, and an expert representing the polio program. This inquiry should 
determine the case, fix responsibilities if a lapse in security arrangements was identified, and make recommendations to 
avoid recurrence of such events. 2) Provinces will be allowed to seek help from civil armed forces or armed forces to 
ensure security cordoning of campaign areas.





Description In 2016, the National Immunization Support Program (NISP) was implemented, with the goal of providing the Government 
of Pakistan with additional funding to strengthen the national EPI program. The NISP has the following objectives: 1) 
Increase the equitable coverage of services for immunization against vaccine preventable diseases (VPD), including 
poliomyelitis, for children between 0 and 23 months in Pakistan, 2) Improve immunization services through 
strengthening Routine Immunization and introduce Systems Strengthening approach, 3) Interruption of transmission of 
indigenous wild Poliovirus by the end of 2015 and certification of a Polio Free Pakistan by the end of 2018.





Description The GPEI launched the Polio Endgame Strategy 2019-2023 in 2019. The Endgame Strategy outlines the strategic plan for 
eradicating polio globally, with a particular focus on the polio-endemic countries. The plan highlights that complete 
polio eradication will require prompt detection and interruption of polio transmission, strong immunizations systems 
and integration of polio surveillance with other VPD surveillance systems, and the ultimate containment of all 
polioviruses.
Classification National programmatic action
PROVINCIAL






Description The Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf (PTI) political party launched the ‘Sehat ka Insaf’ campaign in Khyber Pakthunkhwa in 2014, 
with the goal of protecting children against nine vaccine-preventable diseases, including polio. The campaign was 
initially launched in Peshawar and reached approximately 30,000 families, costing the PTI government roughly 20 billion 
rupees.
Classification Provincial action






Description The ‘Sehat Ka Ittehad’ program was launched in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa in 2015. The ‘Sehat Ka Ittehad’ program was aimed 
at providing polio vaccination, and vaccinations against other diseases such as measles and diarrhea, to children in FATA 







Description The Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Immunization Support Project (KPISP) was launched in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa in 2015. KPISP was 
aimed at providing additional funding to support the province’s existing EPI program, and increasing coverage of VPD, 
including polio, among children.
Classification Provincial action
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surveillance activities [14]. Between 1998 and 1999, Pakistan 
implemented subnational immunization days (SNIDs) which 
introduced the use of a house-to-house vaccination strat-
egy [14].
The start of the new millennium was marked by the 
September 11 attacks against the United States (US), which 
led to the US invading Afghanistan [75]. The start of this war 
increased insecurity and conflict in Afghanistan and bordering 
regions of Pakistan, and posed a threat to polio workers’ 
safety. Displacement and the disruption of Afghanistan’s sur-
veillance system limited polio eradication efforts [76]. In an 
effort to address terrorism in Pakistan, drone strikes began in 
the newly merged districts of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (known at 
that time as the Federally Administered Tribal Area), which 
intensified the belief that vaccination programs had an under-
lying ulterior motive [77].
3.1.2. 2003 – 2006: First partnership for polio eradication
In 2003, the First Partnership for Polio Eradication project was 
implemented by the Government of Pakistan [57]. This project 
was funded by the World Bank, and financed the procurement 
of 371 million oral polio vaccines (OPV) for SIAs between 2003 
and 2006 [57]. In 2005, the Government of Pakistan adopted 
its’ first national EPI policy, which introduced new strategies 
for immunizations and VPD surveillance which would be rele-
vant to polio [70]. In October 2005, the Kashmir Earthquake 
struck; this environmental disaster impacted the delivery of 
polio vaccination campaigns in affected regions, and more 
than 50 medical officers from the polio eradication program 
were critical first responders to the earthquake [78].
3.1.3. 2006-2008: Second partnership for polio eradication
In 2006, the Second Partnership for Polio Eradication project 
was implemented by the Government of Pakistan and 
financed by the World Bank [58]. As an extension to the initial 
project implemented in 2003, the second project financed the 
procurement of approximately 590 million doses of OPV for 
SIAs held between 2006 and 2008 [58]. In 2008, finger–mark-
ing was introduced in to polio campaigns to objectively mea-
sure the quality and reach of campaigns [79].
3.1.4. 2009 – 2012: Third partnership for polio eradication
In 2009, the third, and final, Partnership for Polio Eradication 
project was implemented [59]. The third project, also financed 
by the World Bank, ensured timely supply and procurement of 
OPV for polio campaigns conducted between 2009-2014 [59]. 
In 2009, an Inter-Provincial Committee for Polio (IPCP) was 
established by the Federal Ministry of Health [80,81]. The 
ICPC was chaired by the Federal Minister of Health, and 
brought together health officials working at the provincial 
district, and union council level [80,81]. The existing EPI policy 
was revised in 2009, and provided guidelines which promoted 
greater involvement of lady health workers (LHWs) in immu-
nization delivery [70]. These adjustments hoped to leverage 
the already established cadre of workers embedded in com-
munities. Polio surveillance activities in Pakistan were 
expanded in 2009, through the pilot implementation of envir-
onmental surveillance [80].
Pakistan’s federal health-care system was decentralized in 
2010, after the passing of the 18th Amendment to the 
Constitution [82]. The devolution of health care to 
provinces resulted in staffing shortages in the EPI, and issues 
related to the quality, supply, storage and management of 
GPEI vaccines by provinces [68]. During the 2010 monsoon 
season, devastating floods ravaged the country and affected 
the lives of millions of people [83]. The risk of poliovirus 
transmission was heightened as the monsoon floods resulted 
in a large displacement of populations, damaged health 
infrastructure, and lack of access to water and sanitation 
supplies, particularly in the hardest–hit regions of Central 
Pakistan [83].
In 2011, the GPEI Emergency Action Plan 2012-2013 was 
developed for Pakistan, Nigeria and Afghanistan (the remain-
ing polio–endemic countries) [84]. The plan builds upon the 
GPEI Strategic Plan 2010-2012, and was aimed at getting the 
GPEI back on track to reach it milestones through an emer-
gency approach [84].
With increasing polio case rates in Pakistan, the 2011 
National Emergency Action Plan (NEAP) was created [85]. At 
the federal level, 2011 also saw the establishment of the Prime 
Minister’s Polio Monitoring & Coordination Cell [85]. By work-
ing in close liaison with health agencies at every level, the Cell 
aimed to improve oversight and coordination of polio- 
eradication activities nationwide [86]. The politicization of 
the polio program was heightened in 2011, when Osama Bin 
Laden was killed in Abbottabad [87]. Osama Bin Laden was 
located through a fake hepatitis vaccine program conducted 
by the American CIA, in collaboration with a local Pakistani 
physician [87]. This incident deepened community mistrust 
toward vaccine programs, including polio vaccination pro-
grams, and, for many, confirmed their belief that polio eradi-
cation campaigns were a ploy by the CIA [88].
2012 was characterized by a series of positive and negative 
events. On the positive side, the last case of wild poliovirus 
type 3 (WPV3) in Pakistan was reported in 2012, signifying the 
eradication of two types of wild polioviruses [86]. In addition, 
negotiation efforts led to roughly 30,000 children living in 
Tirah Valley, Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, being vaccinated for the 
first time in three years [89]. Children in Tirah Valley had not 
received polio vaccinations since September 2009 due to 
insecurity which made certain parts of the region inaccessible 
to polio teams [90]. At the same time, the opposite situation 
was unfolding in North and South Waziristan in Federally 
Administered Tribal Area FATA, where local leaders issued 
a complete ban on immunization campaigns [89]. The ban 
was imposed in July 2012 and continued in to 2013, making 
roughly 200,000 children at high risk of contracting polio as 
they could not be accessed by vaccination teams [89]. The ban 
was initiated by Hafiz Gul Bahadur who stated that vaccina-
tions would be halted until the drone strikes stopped [91]. 
That year also marked the beginning of a series of violent 
attacks against polio workers across Pakistan, beginning in 
July 2012 and continuing today [89,92]. The victims of these 
attacks include frontline workers, international consultants/ 
staff, program staff, and even policemen providing security 
[89]. In light of the 2012 attacks, the program’s security was 
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revised, and the program began to operate under a new 
security framework [89].
In response to increasing case rates and brewing vaccine 
hesitancy, 2012 saw the establishment of various new initia-
tives. The President of Pakistan declared polio eradication 
a national emergency, and established the National Task 
Force on Polio Eradication [86]. The 2011 NEAP, which had 
been implemented with limited success, was revised to create 
the 2012 Augmented NEAP [60]. The National Stop 
Transmission of Polio (N-STOP) program, which consisted of 
local and international partners, was implemented in Pakistan 
[89]. Amidst critique of vaccine storage and wastage, and cold 
chain maintenance, the National Vaccine Management 
Committee (NVMC) was also established [68,93]. The NVMC 
included representation from EPI, WHO, and UNICEF [68]
Section 144 of the Criminal Procedure Code was invoked 
for the first time in the context of polio eradication in Pakistan, 
by the District Coordination Officer (DCO) of Faisalabad in 
2012 (according to press releases) [94]. Section 144 was 
imposed in the district, and under Section 188 of the 
Pakistan Penal Code, action could be taken against parents 
who refused to let health teams vaccinate their children dur-
ing polio vaccination campaigns [94]. Despite this being the 
first time that the law held non-compliant caregivers accoun-
table, Section 144 has since been implemented in other cities 
such as Peshawar (2014), Charsadda (2015), and Mardan (2020) 
[95–97].
3.1.5. 2013 – present: yearly national emergency action 
plans (NEAP)
As the partnerships for polio eradication wrapped up in 2014, 
and with limited success of NEAP 2011 and 2012, the imple-
mentation of a yearly NEAP began [60]. The NEAP is a yearly 
plan that outline the program’s eradication strategy, priorities, 
and innovations [98]. In 2013, in response to growing religious 
opposition to polio vaccination, the polio communication 
strategy began to emphasize polio vaccination as an Islamic 
responsibility [99]. That same year, a prominent Pakistani reli-
gious scholar issued a Fatwa (Islamic ruling) urging parents to 
immunize their children against poliovirus [100]. Religious 
advocacy remained a priority in 2014, with the Ulema (promi-
nent Muslim scholars) of Pakistan issuing a Fatwa declaring 
the use of polio vaccine completely permissible under Islamic 
Sharia [101,102].
In 2014, the Government of Pakistan launched the 
Emergency Operations Centers (EOC), at both the federal and 
provincial levels [64,103]. This decision was in response to the 
disjointed management of the polio eradication activities, 
EOCs created a centralized hub and a strong platform for the 
program [64,103]. Despite these coordination efforts, many 
coordination and management issues continued to per-
sist [61].
Sehat ka Insaf (justice for health) campaign was launched in 
Khyber Pakthunkhwa in 2014, with the goal of protecting 
children against nine vaccine-preventable diseases, including 
polio [104]. Other positive developments in Khyber 
Pakhtunkhwa included the resumption of polio campaigns in 
Bara, after five years of inaccessibility [103].
Two other health programs were launched in Khyber 
Pakthunkhwa in 2015; the Sehat Ka Ittehad (unity for health) 
program and the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Immunization Support 
Project (KPISP) [105,106]. The Sehat Ka Ittehad program was 
aimed at providing vaccinations against diseases, including 
polio and measles, to children in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, who 
had not been vaccinated due to inaccessibility or security 
reasons [106,107]. KPISP was aimed at providing additional 
funding to support the province’s existing EPI program, and 
increasing coverage of vaccines for VPD, including polio, 
among children [105]. Peshawar has previously been declared 
the ‘world’s largest reservoir’ of poliovirus by the World Health 
Organization, which had concerned local authorities as it is the 
main urban center of northwest Pakistan [108]. The mass 
movement of populations through Peshawar, coupled with 
insecurity and rumors about the polio vaccine poses contin-
ued threats to polio eradication, thus in 2014 the WHO called 
for immediate action to boost vaccination among children 
residing in Peshawar [108]. In response to misconceptions 
about vaccines being incompatible with the Islamic Shariah 
Law, the Islamic Advisory Group (IAG) adopted a new anti- 
polio action plan which incorporated advocacy and commu-
nication activities in 2015 [109]. The national EPI policy was 
revised in 2015; additionally, one dose of IPV was introduced 
in to the routine immunization schedule [70]. In light of 
ongoing attacks against polio workers, the security plan for 
polio workers was revised in 2015, and included the program’s 
utilization of civil armed forces for heightened security protec-
tion [110].
In 2016, the National Immunization Support Program (NISP) 
was implemented, which provided the Government of 
Pakistan with additional funding to strengthen the national 
EPI program [111,112]. Between 2016 and 2019, a series of 
partnerships were formed between the polio program and 
public and private organizations such as Zong (mobile net-
work operator company), K-Electric (energy company), Coca- 
Cola Pakistan and Survey of Pakistan (public government 
agency) to support program efforts [85,113,114]. Similarly, 
program partnerships with celebrities, such as Wasim Akram 
and Shahid Afridi (well–known cricketers), have been used to 
promote and highlight the importance of polio [115]. In 2019, 
with only two polio endemic countries remaining, the GPEI 
launched the Polio Endgame Strategy 2019–2023 [69]. This 
strategy outlines the plan for eradicating polio globally, and 
focuses on strategies which need to be implemented in 
Pakistan and Afghanistan [69].
3.2. Barriers and facilitators
The following sections will outline the barriers and facilitators 
to the delivery and uptake of polio vaccination. These factors 
have been divided into sections that focus on the beliefs and 
experiences of caregivers, the Pakistani Polio program, and 
threats to Pakistan’s polio eradication activities.
3.2.1. Caregiver beliefs, knowledge, and experiences
Caregiver’s beliefs and knowledge about polio vaccination 
were identified by our literature review as an important barrier 
and facilitator to polio vaccination. Several articles cited 
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misbeliefs and misperceptions about polio vaccination as 
a barrier to increasing vaccination rates. The beliefs were of 
two different types; demographic, geopolitical, and religious 
concerns, and misbeliefs about when a child could be vacci-
nated [26,27,31–33,36,38–42,44,49,53,54,56,65]. Misbeliefs 
about when a child could be vaccinated were less common, 
and included caregivers who believed that they could not 
vaccinate their child if the child was unwell [33,42]. Fear of 
side effects was highlighted by multiple studies as one of the 
key reasons for refusing vaccination [25,30–-
,30–32,35,36,41,42,45,47,48,52,54]. The majority of these stu-
dies did not describe specifically the type or nature of side 
effects that caregivers feared.
Demographic, geopolitical, and religious concerns, which 
were more commonly cited in the literature, were often char-
acterized in the literature as rumors about polio vaccination. 
Demographic concerns were focused on the potential fertility 
impacts of the polio vaccine on increasing sterility 
[27,31,35,36,38–41,44,47–49]. Closely related to demographic 
concerns were geopolitical anxieties about the true motive 
underlying the vaccine [26,40,44,49]. Several studies described 
community fears that the polio campaign was part of a US, 
specifically CIA, agenda [40], while others highlighted commu-
nity concerns about the involvement of foreign NGOs [44]. At 
the core of geopolitical anxieties were demographic concerns 
about shrinking the Muslim population as part of a foreign 
agenda [49]. Questions about the religious permissibility of the 
polio vaccine were also common [27,31,32,36,38–-
32,36,38–41,44,49,53,54,56,65]. In some contexts, these under-
standings were related to the belief that haram 
(impermissible) ingredients such as pig by–products were 
used in the polio vaccine [40,44,49].
Limited knowledge of immunization schedules and the 
need for multiple polio vaccinations was highlighted by sev-
eral studies as leading to incomplete polio vaccination 
[32,33,42,45,52,54]. Conversely, caregiver’s awareness of the 
benefits of polio vaccination for their children was a strong 
facilitator of vaccination [32,35,42,47,48,56].
The type of information caregivers received, and the source 
was also cited as an essential factor to polio vaccination. 
Tailored messages specific to the needs of the local commu-
nity were described as an important strategy to encourage 
polio vaccination [46]. However, exposure to messaging about 
the benefits of polio vaccination is not sufficient, as several 
studies highlighted community members who did not trust 
the messaging about the vaccines effectiveness, utility, or 
necessity [25,27,41,42,45,47,48,54]. Trust in government insti-
tutions and foreign agencies involved in polio campaigns 
affected receptivity to vaccination. Repeated polio campaigns 
had contributed to community fatigue and fostered vaccine 
hesitancy [27,50,66]. Frustrations with the lack of essential 
services such as poor water and sanitation also fostered mis-
trust in the Pakistani government and contributed to polio 
vaccine refusal [26,66]. Conversely, the literature highlighted 
how positive experiences through community outreach activ-
ities facilitated polio vaccinations [32,63,64]. The importance 
of communication strategies such as Sehat Muhafiz (health 
security) was highlighted by one study as shifting beliefs 
about polio activities and healthcare workers [63]. Several 
documents highlighted how trust in the healthcare workers 
delivering vaccination could also foster trust and acceptance 
of the services provided by these workers, particularly polio 
vaccines [32,64,65]. A few studies highlighted how caregivers 
only partially or entirely refused vaccinating their children 
because they had experienced negative treatment by health-
care workers [42,54].
3.2.2. Polio program: governance and oversight
Governance and oversight of the polio program experienced 
significant challenges that hindered program delivery. Staff 
morale and job satisfaction was highlighted as an issue in 
polio eradication efforts. Several studies highlighted com-
plaints among polio workers related to insufficient remunera-
tion [26,43,46–48] and inefficient and delayed payment 
mechanisms [26,50,65]. Several studies argued that low pay 
with limited incentives such as promotions and raises 
[26,43,46] coupled with intense pressure and job insecurity 
of temporary posts had led to exhaustion and dissatisfaction 
[26,46]. Attacks on healthcare workers and increased insecurity 
exacerbated their dissatisfaction with their job [26]. 
Transportation was also an issue for many vaccinators 
[32,43,47,67]. Although they were expected to reach areas 
that were far off, they did not have access to vehicles 
[47,48], or at times funds for fuel or vehicle repairs [67]; thus, 
many of these far-flung areas remained unvaccinated [43].
Critiques persisted about the poor selection and training of 
polio workers [50,62,63]. The hiring of locals as healthcare work-
ers has proven to be a successful strategy as it allows the 
leveraging of local knowledge, related to the local context and 
the specific households of missed children, both of which are 
key to eradication [60,65]. However, nepotism often played 
a role in how polio workers were identified. Insufficient training 
of vaccinators and other health workers [29,32] resulted in 
issues with both their technical skills [32,45,46] and their knowl-
edge about the virus [32,46]. Limited training and knowledge of 
polio has been seen to be a particular concern with LHWs [37]. 
Concerns related to the training of vaccinators have also been 
highlighted by caregivers and community members. One study 
also highlighted how caregivers themselves were unsatisfied 
with the training of vaccinators who they saw as not providing 
sufficient instructions on how to position a child’s head during 
vaccination [32]. The need for further training also extended to 
management, with managers not having the requisite skills 
related to resource allocation and HR management [46].
Limited preparation and accountability were best evi-
denced during campaigns. Pre-campaign trainings have been 
critiqued for being ineffective and having low engagement 
from staff, particularly area-in-charge (AIC) and medical offi-
cers [50]. Preparation meetings were not conducted, even 
though they were reported as having been completed. Many 
of the trainings that did occur were seen as formalities [50]. 
During campaigns, vaccinator absences were also a key issue 
[42,45,67]. Ineffective use of teams to wrong areas, or for 
insufficient periods was also an issue [50]. AICs are tasked 
with monitoring the field activities of vaccinators, however, 
many of them do not provide this feedback [50]. Vaccine 
ledgers and tally sheets were also highlighted as having errors 
10 A. ATAULLAHJAN ET AL.
[68] Many vaccinators doubted that they would be held 
accountable for their performance [26,50]. Microplans were 
also not utilized to their best of their ability. Although these 
documents were developed, they were not used effectively 
during campaign preparation and many of these had signifi-
cant gaps [50,63,64]. Moreover, many implementing partners 
did not enforce the use of microplans during campaign activ-
ities [50]. Field monitoring systems are an area which requires 
concerted improvement [50].
Reliable surveillance systems are also key to polio eradication 
strategy and planning [57]. Some of these probable surveillance 
gaps have been highlighted as contributing to outbreaks such 
as the cVDPV2 outbreak in Jaffarabad and Mastung Districts. 
Better integration between AFP, VPD, disease early warning 
system (DEWS), and health management information systems 
(HMIS) reporting systems would allow more sensitive monitor-
ing of field activities [50]. The current AFP surveillance systems 
have been critiqued for its limited sensitivity to capture the 
circulation of polio virus [50,62]. Efforts to improve the sensitiv-
ity of the AFP surveillance system have however been imple-
mented in the past. In 2004, the collection of stool samples was 
expanded to include the direct contacts of AFP patients for 
whom stool-specimen collection, storage, or shipment, to the 
laboratory was inadequate or questionable [116]. Between 2000 
and 2004, the non-polio–associated AFP rate (NFAFP) increased 
from 1.53 to 3.53 cases per 100,000, and the percentage of AFP 
cases for which adequate stool specimens were collected 
increased from 71% to 88% (Figure 4). Targeted surveys have 
led to accurate assessments of missed populations, particularly 
HRMP, and development of focused vaccination strategies 
[63,65].
A lack of adherence to and enforcement of protocols 
related to vaccine supply and storage were also highlighted. 
Many studies described concerns related to cold chain main-
tenance [28,29,34,41,45–48,58,67,68] due to noncompliance 
[45,58], maintenance of cooling units [45,46,67,68], and load- 
shedding [46–48]. Insufficient vaccine supplies and delays in 
receiving vaccines hindered the effectiveness of polio eradica-
tion activities [29,32,33,35,68].
Government ownership of polio eradication through pro-
viding sustained oversight to activities and establishing strong 
partnerships with donors and experts is an important aspect 
of polio eradication activities [58,60,61,63,64]. However, coor-
dination between different levels of government including 
central, provincial and district managers is limited and incon-
sistent [29,46].
The 18th amendment and devolution of powers is believed 
to have contributed to the confusion of responsibilities at 
different levels of government [46]. Leadership transitions 
and political interference have exacerbated the effectiveness 
of polio eradication activities [43,46,66]. In order to improve 
coordination, EOCs and polio control rooms have been estab-
lished as part of the NEAP to ensure oversight and account-
ability of the NEAP [62,63]. Regular meetings between the 
Prime Minister’s Polio Monitoring and Coordination Cell, 
Chief secretaries, and other provincial and district level officials 
have also been used as a strategy to improve engagement 
and in turn, campaign effectiveness [60].
Integration of polio with broader health services has also 
come to the forefront as an important strategy to facilitate 
polio vaccination [28,63]. As the 2018-2019 NEAP highlighted 
multi-level, interdisciplinary, and multi–agency collaboration is 
an important strategy to support polio eradication [65]. Polio 
activities, such as SIA, have been critiqued for being disjointed 
from routine EPI services [50]. Moreover, there is still 
a pressing need for engagement with other preventive health 
programs [46], supportive government agencies [66], and the 
private sector [43].
Structural issues related to health infrastructure develop-
ment were an obstacle for parents seeking routine 
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immunization services. Physical proximity and access to health 
facility was highlighted as a key facilitator of polio vaccination 
[40,42]. Families that live far away from EPI centers often cited 
that this was one of their reasons for refusing immunization 
[25,30,31,35,36,42,45,47,48,52,54,67]. Constraints to caregivers 
time and schedules also acted as a barrier to vaccinating their 
children [25,28,30,32,35,42,45,47,48,54].
3.2.3. Pakistani context: climate and insecurity threats
Pakistan faces significant challenges related to environmental 
factors and insecurity. Climate shocks such as the floods in 
2010 have proved to be a challenge for polio vaccination as 
displaced populations moved into crowded and unsanitary 
temporary living situations where polio spread easily [59]. 
Pakistan’s high population density and warm climate are also 
conditions conducive to the spread of polio [30].
Insecurity and terrorism have been a persistent barrier to 
polio eradication efforts [26–29,36,39,40,47,48,50,54,55,58, 
59,61,67]. Vaccination bans, such as those in North and 
South Waziristan in 2012, limited access to pockets of popula-
tions [59]. While attacks on healthcare workers have cultivated 
fear among healthcare workers. For instance, the targeted 
killing of a healthcare worker in UC-4 Gadap Town Karachi 
led to healthcare workers avoiding those areas [61]. Healthcare 
workers frequently experienced verbal abuse when delivering 
polio vaccinations [40,44]. At times, they also experienced 
physical abuse, as one study described a health worker who 
was hit in the face by a father angrily refusing polio vaccina-
tion [26]. As discussed above, working in this difficult environ-
ment had a negative impact on worker motivation [26]. 
Improvements in the security situation in Shangla and Swat, 
and the subsequent increase of polio vaccination, demon-
strate the role of insecurity in polio vaccination rate [36].
4. Conclusion
As our review has demonstrated, Pakistan’s failure to eradicate 
polio cannot be traced to one underlying cause. Instead, it is 
essential that one considers the web of factors that have 
thwarted Pakistan’s polio eradication efforts [117]. Although 
consistently present throughout the polio program, these fac-
tors have emerged more strongly at different periods in 
response to different conditions and events. Programs and 
policies have attempted to respond to these concerns but at 
times, these delays have also led to an increase in polio cases.
At its onset, Pakistan’s eradication efforts experienced sig-
nificant success. Eradication of polio seemed feasible with case 
rates of 1803 in 1994 falling to 28 cases in 2006 [118]. 
However, the optimism associated with the program soon 
dwindled as the country started to experience steady 
increases in polio cases. By 2008, there were a documented 
118 cases of polio in Pakistan. The early success of the polio 
program demonstrated that Pakistan had the technical capa-
city to implement polio eradication efforts [119]. Yet, the 
increase in polio cases in the 2000s indicated that there 
were underlying issues with the polio vaccination activities. 
Underlying increasing polio cases in the late 2000s was incon-
sistent governance and limited oversight [120,121].The 
creation and launch of the 2011 NEAP led to little progress 
on the ground [120,121]. Dysfunctional governance including 
fragmented responsibility and limited accountability contin-
ued to drive polio cases [120,121]. As cases steadily increased 
from 89 in 2009 to 198 in 2011, restrategization of polio 
eradication plans became necessary [118]. Through the aug-
mented 2012 NEAP, the polio eradication program was able to 
improve management issues and increase accountability 
[9,122].
However, as governance and management issues started to 
improve in 2012, terrorism and insecurity increased across 
Pakistan. Threats of violence against polio workers began to 
increase, ultimately culminating in to violent attacks against 
polio teams. In 2012, 22 polio workers were killed [122]. 
Security and access emerged as one of the most important 
barriers to polio vaccinations. The increase of polio refusals 
and propagation of rumors reflected fractured community 
trust. Insufficient community-based strategies and unmet 
needs in maternal and child health services only exacerbated 
the situation. Pakistan’s increasing polio case count made it 
the key obstacle to global polio eradication. In June 2014, 
military intervention in Waziristan improved access to popula-
tions where the majority of polio cases were concentrated 
[123]. This includes improving vaccination among high-risk 
mobile populations where there are often larger clusters of 
cases [12]. Many of these individuals travel within Pakistan but 
also cross the border between Afghanistan and Pakistan [124]. 
Initiatives such as all age vaccination points in Torkham Gate 
(Khyber Pakhtunkhwa) and Friendship Gate (Balochistan), and 
improved tracking and surveillance of polio in this group is an 
important priority for government officials, although some of 
these activities have been disrupted due to COVID-19 [66,125].
More recently, governance and oversight challenges have 
again emerged as a key challenge for the polio program. 
Political interference has hindered polio eradication activities 
[15,16] Inconsistent leadership has only worsened after the 
2018 elections. Leading into these elections, the international 
community expressed concern that polio eradication activities 
may be disrupted by any political transitions. Despite assur-
ance that Senator Ayesha Raza Farooq, the Prime Minister’s 
Focal Person for Polio Eradication, would continue in her 
position to give continuity to program activities, she resigned 
after the election [124]. The government did not announce 
anyone to take her place, leaving the polio program with 
a leadership vacuum for several months [124]. The subsequent 
appointee, Babar Bin Atta, has since resigned and been 
accused of corruption [126].
5. Expert opinion
5.1. Reframing resistance
Among the many reasons contributing to the failure of 
Pakistan’s polio eradication effort, the Pakistan polio pro-
gram has maintained a vertical strategy that narrowly 
focuses on the eradication of one disease without support-
ing primary health care or other preventive healthcare ser-
vices [117]. Not only has the use of such a strategy diverted 
attention and resources from key primary healthcare 
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services, it has also played a role in cultivating suspicion of 
polio vaccination. As our findings have demonstrated, com-
munity concerns related to limited health infrastructure and 
services played a role in the receptivity to polio vaccination. 
Pakistan’s polio eradication activities, which are relatively 
well funded, occur against the backdrop of an underfunded 
and under-resourced health system [91,127]. The exorbitant 
attention given to polio by the policymakers fuels skepti-
cism of the true reasons underlying the program especially 
with other health services being severely underfunded 
[117]. As Closser and Coburn argue, for many children, 
a polio visit is the only health service they obtain [91]. 
Repeated polio campaigns have only contributed to con-
cerns about the agenda underlying polio campaigns and 
resulted in community, and health worker, fatigue 
[27,50,66,128]. As part of the GPEI Endgame strategy, the 
government has committed to integrating EPI activities, 
such as routine immunization, with polio vaccination [69]. 
Such a strategy will be essential to engaging communities 
that are marginalized and disenfranchised [128]. Moreover, 
the integration of polio activities within other preventive 
health services may present an opportunity for the genera-
tion of trust [129].
As our review has demonstrated, rumors and mistrust of 
the polio vaccine are common in Pakistan. Situating this resis-
tance to polio vaccination within its larger backdrop is essen-
tial to understanding and shifting beliefs. Geopolitics, military 
intervention, and ethnic tensions are key elements of the 
landscape within which polio vaccination occurs. Most recent 
estimates suggest that 26% of WPV cases in 2020 and 63% of 
WPV cases in 2019 were in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa [2], with 
cases in cities such as Karachi concentrated in areas populated 
by Pakhtuns [19]. It is unsurprising that polio refusals have 
been mainly from Pakhtun populations, many of whom live in 
or are from geographies that have been the most affected by 
drone attacks, foreign military intervention, and terrorism. The 
belief of polio rumors has been closely linked to feelings of 
marginalization and disenfranchisement [130]. Analysis of 
polio resistance among Pakhtuns has illustrated that misper-
ceptions and belief in rumors mirror larger political debates in 
Pakistan [125]. Within the context of extended low-grade 
conflict, community fears related to foreign involvement in 
polio vaccine could be anticipated [91]. Emerging research 
has demonstrated that military action such as drone attacks 
further fragment community trust in polio activities [77,91]. In 
fact, the 2012 vaccination ban in North and South Waziristan 
was a direct response to these activities, and a desire for these 
attacks to be halted [91]. The political nature of refusals to 
polio asks us to reconsider some of our strategies to ensure 
the uptake of polio vaccination. For instance, the use of sec-
tion 144 of the Criminal Procedure Code and section 188 of 
the Pakistan Penal Code to arrest refusal parents may deepen 
distrust of the state and vaccination [130–132]. Also, the 
involvement of security forces to assist with polio efforts 
may confirm community’s fears that there is an ulterior motive 
underlying these activities [133].
The connection between disenfranchisement and polio is 
perhaps best evident in the way that polio vaccination has 
been used as a bargaining chip to obtain government services 
[16]. This practice speaks to self-perceived powerlessness of 
the community, and their belief that exploiting the govern-
ment’s commitment to eradicate polio is the best strategy to 
obtain a desired social service. It is clear that resistance to 
polio vaccination often signals deeper inequities rooted in 
underdevelopment, a lack of critical public health services, 
disenfranchisement, and marginalization. Integrating polio 
vaccination into comprehensive primary care services, as part 
of a larger strategy to provide development and infrastructure 
needs, is essential.
5.2. Research gaps and opportunities
The current literature on polio in Pakistan has been dominated 
by a focus on user perspectives. This literature has primarily 
focused on the beliefs and knowledge of caregivers. Literature 
focusing on the perspectives of program workers, partner 
organizations, and government representatives is limited. 
The few studies that include these perspectives have still 
focused on their perspectives on caregiver views of polio 
vaccination. There is a key gap in our understanding of how 
to improve coordination and collaboration between different 
levels of government agencies and partner organizations. 
Focused in-depth research in this area could generate key 
recommendations for policymakers. Moreover, despite mis-
trust of polio eradication efforts being cited in the literature 
for over a decade, there is limited research on how this trust 
can be cultivated by the polio program. Further research on 
how to develop trust between communities, particularly 
HRMP, and government agencies could have important 
impacts on polio activities. One of the limitations of our 
study is that we did not include serological research that 
investigated the appropriateness of vaccine variants given 
their differing efficacy on virus variants. Evidence from India 
demonstrates that the success of their program was highly 
contingent on responsive and modified approaches to distri-
buting tOPV, bOPV, and mOPV to geographic hotspots during 
different outbreaks [134]. In Pakistan, many of these policy 
changes are relatively recent (see Figure 1); however, further 
research is still needed to understand the role of these vaccine 
transitions on polio eradication efforts.
There is also the opportunity to nuance our current under-
standing of perceived barriers to polio vaccination. The focus 
on the religious opposition to polio vaccination has been 
reductive. Moreover, the current engagement of religious lea-
ders to encourage polio vaccination has not been able to 
entirely convince the public. Literature on Islam and health 
practices has demonstrated that religious beliefs are consis-
tently negotiated and contested [135,136]. The question 
remains how then can that be leveraged to address vaccine 
hesitancy in Pakistan. Understanding the nature of these 
beliefs is essential to ensuring that policy and programmatic 
activities fully address these concerns.
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Finally, the engagement of local partners in future research 
is essential, particularly in areas of clinical research and disease 
modeling. This is an understudied area, with the first study on 
seroprevalence in Pakistan published in 2013 [137]. Moreover, 
the genetic studies and disease modeling that has occurred has 
been largely led by foreign institutions which obscure local 
academic voices. It is essential that local experts with important 
contextual details are funded and supported in these research 
activities and centered in the academic discourse. Engagement 
of local institutions must also include universities and academic 
centers that are in the areas most affected by polio including 
Balochistan and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa.
The goal of global polio eradication is ambitious and 
requires the buy-in from multiple stakeholders at different 
levels of the health system. Pakistan has continuously fallen 
behind on its milestones and optimism has begun to wane 
[138]. If Pakistan is to make progress toward this goal in the 
next five years, it will require concerted and targeted efforts. 
As we have described, the Pakistan Polio Programme has 
experienced large amounts of variability due to variable 
governance, and weak management. Poor governance has 
thwarted Pakistan’s polio eradication efforts [128]. Creating 
systems of accountability to address corruption, and vari-
able governance will be fundamental to its success. 
Ensuring continuity after election cycles will ensure that 
any progress made will not be undone. Moreover, as one 
epidemiologic zone, eradication in Pakistan is contingent 
upon eradication in Afghanistan and vice versa [15]. 
Improved collaboration toward the common goal of polio 
eradication and cross-country learnings can help improve 
vaccination uptake.
As the COVID-19 pandemic continues, it is unclear the 
extent of the impacts it has had on polio vaccination rates. 
The disruption of polio vaccination programs to control the 
spread of COVID-19, continued social distancing, and supply 
issues may have serious long-term impacts on the progress 
made by the polio program [139]. Now, more than ever, it is 
essential that Pakistan scale up its polio efforts to vaccinate 
missed children during the disrupted vaccines campaigns. 
Any gains made by the Pakistan polio program are precar-
ious given the latent potential for polio outbreaks [117]. As 
we have seen with incidents such as in Cairo, polio in 
Pakistan is a risk to the efforts of other countries glob-
ally [117].
Ultimately, for as long as EPI coverage continues to be low 
and there is limited coordination between EPI and the polio 
program, increasing polio vaccination rates will continue to be 
a problem. As our review demonstrates, the current approach 
of a vertical polio eradication strategy has limitations 
[140,141]. Unless polio eradication is sufficiently integrated 
into other health and preventive services including child 
health, nutrition, and routine immunization, a vertical program 
is likely to fail. Furthermore, if current polio eradication efforts 
do not adequately address the community’s underlying con-
cerns related to polio vaccination, there is little chance that 
the eradication efforts will be unable to achieve their goal 
[141]. Pakistan has the potential to make large gains toward 
polio eradication in the next five years; however, this will 
require consistent leadership and political support of the 
program.
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Appendix I: Search strategy





6. Azad Jammu and Kashmir.mp. [mp=title, abstract, original title, 
name of substance word, subject heading word, floating sub- 
heading word, keyword heading word, organism supplementary 
concept word, protocol supplementary concept word, rare disease 
supplementary concept word, unique identifier, synonyms]
7. exp ‘Azad Jammu and Kashmir’/
8. gilgit-baltistan.mp. or exp Gilgit-Baltistan/
9. Islamabad.mp.
10. 1 or 2 or 3 or 4 or 5 or 6 or 7 or 8 or 9
11. exp poliomyelitis vaccine/or exp poliomyelitis/or exp Poliomyelitis 
virus/or exp oral poliomyelitis vaccine/
12. polio*.mp.
13. exp inactivated vaccine/or inactivated polio vaccine.mp.
14. eradicat*.mp.
15. eradication.mp. or exp disease eradication/
16. exp virus transmission/
17. exp communicable disease/
18. exp infection control/
19. exp disease transmission/
20. exp capacity building/
21. outreach.mp.
22. ‘integrated service delivery’.mp.
23. exp immunization/or exp mass immunization/
24. immuniz*.mp.
25. vaccin*.mp.
26. exp health program/
27. immunization program.mp.
28. ‘supplementary immunization’.mp.
29. exp disease surveillance/
30. surveillance.mp.
31. exp health program/
32. intervention.mp. or exp intervention study/
33. exp preventive health service/
34. advoca*.mp.
35. 11 or 12 or 13 or 14 or 15 or 16 or 17 or 18 or 19
36. 20 or 21 or 22 or 23 or 24 or 25 or 26 or 27 or 28 or 29 or 30 or 31 
or 32 or 33 or 34
37. 10 and 35 and 36
38. limit 37 to english language and yr=‘2000 -Current’
39. campaign.mp.
40. program.mp.
41. 36 or 39 or 40
42. 10 and 35 and 41
43. limit 42 to english language and yr=‘2000 -Current’
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